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ABSTRACT
This short article looks to consider the use of
punishment for those offenders suffering with a
mental health issue and the particular difficulties
inherent in a system that has little in the way of
secure social provision (RCP, 2004). Particular
attention is paid to the use of imprisonment,
where clear guidance exists in the Mental Health
Act 1983 for the diversion of such offenders from
custody at the earliest opportunity. The article
will consider the historic and current debate
surrounding the role and use of capital punish-
ment, looking to examples from within the
United Kingdom and in the contemporary
United States of America. Finally, the discussion
will make reference to the argument of a moral
panic (Cohen, 2002), which leads to a political
and social discourse, and the media contribution
to the debate of a return for capital punishment.
INTRODUCTION
A rethink is needed for offenders with
mental health problems, with a shift from
prison to more appropriate settings
(RCP, 2004)
It seems evident that where questions arise
regarding the appropriateness of punish-
ment, it is never more important than when
dealing with vulnerable offenders and those
suffering some form of mental health diffi-
culty. Historically, the debate has centred on
the use of custody and capital punishment,
in which numerous examples suggest cau-
tion is needed. In contrast to the findings
International Journal of Police
Science and Management,
Vol. 10 No. 3, 2008, pp. 280-288.
DOI: 10.1350/ijps.2008.10.3.84
Page 280
International Journal of Police Science & Management Volume 10 Number 3
of the Rethinking Crime & Punishment
(RCP) Report (2004), current legislation,
namely the Mental Health Act 1983, sug-
gests that the individual should be diverted
from the criminal justice system as early in
the proceedings as is possible.
DISCRETION AND DEFINITION
There seems to be an issue even in points as
simple as definitions and in the use of key
terms of reference. For instance, the Mental
Health Act 1983 uses mental disorder and
mental illness, almost interchangeably, leav-
ing some room for professional discretion.
This short discussion will consider mental
health as being a construction of the social
culture and of the times in which it is
defined. In doing so the discourse will
make use of a number of examples from the
UK, a nation State that has not used the
death penalty since the case of Peter
Anthony Allen and Gywnne Owen Evans
in August 1964. The discussion will also
consider the situation in the United States
and discuss contemporary arguments for the
use of capital punishment. The discussion
touches upon Cohen’s Folk Devils and Moral
Panics (2002) as a means of explaining the
recurrent debate for the return of the death
penalty in such cases as those of Derek
Bentley and Peter Sutcliffe, and the media
furore which accompanies such cases.
According to the Mental Health Act
1983, s. 1(2) mental disorder is defined as:
‘. . . “mental disorder” means mental illness,
arrested or incomplete development of the
mind, psychopathic disorder and any other
disorder or disability of the mind’. How-
ever, Hollin (1992) notes that accordingly a
criminal act is denoted by the fact that there
is a guilty mind (mens rea) and a guilty act
(actus reus). It is arguable, says Crow (2001),
whether these are always present in an
offender with a mental disorder, and
although there are provisions in place to
ensure that the individual is given an assess-
ment at the earliest opportunity, usually at
the pre-sentence stage, if the individual is
not already known to the health/criminal
justice service(s), it is not always the case
that they are diverted from the criminal
justice system (Flynn, 1998). Indeed, Flynn
goes on to cite a number of reasons for this,
concluding that the individual may not be
diverted for reasons as simple as a lack of
definition or lack of understanding. It is
worth noting, at this point, that according
to Hollin (1992), Peay (1997) and Hagell
and Dowling (2001) there is no legal defini-
tion of insanity. Instead, it would seem that
the legal system has preferred to leave med-
ical matters and definitions to the medical
world.
Kemshall, Canton and Bailey (2004) note
that even defining who falls into the cat-
egory of mentally disordered offenders is
problematic ‘. . . and may include offenders
whose mental health difficulties are sig-
nificant but not necessarily of a type or
severity to bring them within the remit of
the Mental Health Act 1983’. Conversely,
Yellowlees (1953) states that Blackwell
made reference to a legal definition during
the eighteenth century, suggesting that ‘The
lunatic, or non compos mentis, is one who
hath had understanding, but by disease,
grief, or other accident, hath lost the use of
his reason . . .’ (Yellowlees, 1953, p. 136).
Yellowlees goes on to say that although it is
not much of a definition, Blackwell was
ahead of his time in attempting to define
mental illness. Furthermore, Peay (1997,
p. 664) has quoted Lord Devlin as saying:
. . . it is reason which makes a man
responsible to the law, reason and reason
alone . . . It is what distinguishes him
from the animals, which emotional dis-
order does not; it is what makes him a
man; it is what makes him subject to the
law. So it is fitting that nothing other
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than a defect of reason should give com-
plete absolution.
This then would seem to suppose that there
is at least a legal recognition of the issues, if
not a legal definition. Yet Peay also points
out that such a clear distinction is in itself
problematic. ‘To argue for the existence of
a discrete group of mentally disordered
offenders, presupposes a category of men-
tally ordered offenders’ (Peay, 1997).
Mental illness is a social concept and has
in the past been used to explain many
differing forms of behaviour that have fallen
outside the norm of society. The concept,
and its definition, are flexible and change-
able over time and are governed more by
the social morals and values attributable to
‘normal behaviour’ than by a set of discern-
ible criteria. What is needed first is a defini-
tion of ‘normal’ and, second, of ‘illness’. In
fact a point for further discussion is the role
that a social definition plays in mental
health, and indeed in defining something
likely to be linked with our genes.
It was not uncommon, says Carlen
(1998), for women to be defined as men-
tally ill during the late eighteenth and the
nineteenth centuries. Carlen continues that
this was often the case if they did not meet
or act in the socially accepted ways. Mason
and Mercer concur, suggesting that women
were often seen to be deviant, dysfunctional
and altogether ‘. . . like the insane’, if they
did not conform with the moral and soci-
etal norms (Mason & Mercer, 1999). For
instance, giving birth outside of marriage
was often seen to be evidence of a weak
mind and body, and cause enough for
someone to be defined as mentally ill.
Consequently, sexual deviancy and
promiscuity, immoral conduct or depend-
ency on drugs and/or alcohol, are issues
addressed under the Mental Health Act
1983 which goes some way to protecting
the individual from misrepresentation and
value judgement so common in the history
of mental illness (Turner, 1996). Mason and
Mercer (1999, p. 65) conclude that, ‘for
medical men of the nineteenth century,
deviant women represented a threat to the
stability of family life, and ultimately the
social order . . . a “species” apart’.
Conversely, Yellowlees (1953) gives a
complete admonition of the British legal
system. He suggests that it has always been
the position of the British legal system to
divert the individual into medical care
wherever possible; giving its emphasis more
to the medical treatment of the criminally
insane than to look for retribution. It is to
the credit of the British legal system that the
law has been unwilling to punish the
insane. He continues (at p. 136), ‘. . . it is no
more than the truth that at one time the
law’s treatment of criminal lunatics was not
nearly as harsh as the doctors’ treatment of
unoffending ones’. However, this would
seem to be anything but the truth, as such
cases as Derek Bentley would seem to tes-
tify. Although a little after the work of
Yellowlees, Bentley’s case is testament to the
miscarriages that have continued within the
British legal system for centuries. Derek
Bentley was hanged at Wandsworth prison
on 28 January 1953, for the murder of a
police constable in South London. How-
ever, at the time of the trial, it was known
that, first, Bentley did not fire the fatal shot
that took the life of the police officer and,
second, that Bentley, aged 19, had the men-
tality of an 11-year-old child. Even though
these facts were known, it took some 45
years for the British justice system to
acknowledge any wrongdoing and grant a
parsimonious pardon (Campbell, 1995).
A second such case is that of Timothy
Evans who, in March 1950, stood trial, and
was subsequently hanged, for the murder of
his wife and daughter. Yet, Timothy Evans
was said to be a loving husband and a caring
father, not the picture of a murderer. In
1953 John Christie, the Evans family land-
lord, was arrested, tried and convicted of
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the murder of his wife and six other
women, including that of Beryl Evans, wife
of Timothy Evans. In 1966, some 16 years
after John Christie had acted as the chief
prosecution witness in the Evans family
murder case, Timothy Evans was given a
grudging pardon (Gudjonsson, 2003). What
remains of interest is that it appears no one
thought to enquire of Timothy Evans’s state
of mind after finding his wife and daughter
dead.
However, examples abound, and not just
from history. More recently there have been
cases such as that of David Bradley who had
been suffering from mental illness for a
number of years. Bradley shot four mem-
bers of his own family before calmly walk-
ing into the local police station, placing a
home-made bomb on the counter and
informing the duty officer of what had
happened and that he wished to hand him-
self in (Wainwright, 2007). Do these (and
so many other) cases show more evidence
of a critical reaction on the part of the State
and a need to convict in such distressing
cases? It may be so that in such cases we see
reflections of Cohen’s (2002) ‘moral panic’.
Peter Sutcliffe is an example of how the
system may work against itself in the need
to support justice and foster social calm.
Prior to Sutcliffe’s arraignment, says Peace
(2003), both the counsel for the defence
and prosecution had agreed that Sutcliffe
had been suffering from paranoid schizo-
phrenia at the time of the murders, yet the
trial judge made the decision that it should
be left to the jury to decide upon Sutcliffe’s
mental state at that time and not be reliant
upon the psychiatric reports. This followed
one of the most horrific periods in British
homicide, which was sensationalised by the
press, following every aspect and detail of
the case and the trial. Prior to Sutcliffe’s
arrest and subsequent conviction, the media
had reported continually and sensationally
on the murders, yet such is the fascination
for the British media that they have con-
tinued to report in such a fashion through-
out recent years. For Cohen (2002), once
the action takes place and the reporting
begins, it is the social reaction which will
inevitably drive the ‘fear of crime’ and the
panic which ensues. It is interesting that
months after the trial had concluded, says
Peace (2003), Sutcliffe’s mental capacity was
again questioned. To this, Hollin (1992)
adds that three years after conviction Sut-
cliffe was removed from the prison system
and placed into a secure unit.
Cases like these are not hard to find
throughout history (eg Evans, Bentley,
Lattimore and Leighton (in the Confait
murder) and Bradley) and not all lead to the
death penalty, but certainly leave questions
over the basis of conviction. Indeed what
seems to cause difficulty is giving a reason
for the continued use of capital punish-
ment. Hollin (1992, p. 112) quotes Gerald
Gardiner QC as saying that ‘Capital punish-
ment is a convenient phrase: but what it
really means is that once a month they take
some man, woman or youth out of a cell
and kill him or her on a gallows’. This
would seem to suggest that even during a
period in which the British legal system had
the use of the death penalty, its popularity
was greatly waning. Two points would arise
from this: first, given that once the death
penalty has been used the decision cannot
be rescinded, the hanged man cannot be
brought back to life. And second, if there is
no possibility of the death penalty, then
why have a plea of insanity in the first
place?
The plea of insanity stems from the need
to recognise that in any number of cases
those accused do not always comprehend
what has happened and even in those cases
where they do, they may not have the
mental capacity to realise right from wrong
(Hollin, 1992). Crucially, in Britain there
must be criminal intent, ie individuals must
have known the act is wrong and recognise
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that they are doing wrong. Consequently,
without the concept of mens rea the system
begins to falter. Mason and Mercer (1999)
concur, concluding that mens rea calls for an
acceptance that all of us have the free will to
act as we choose, where in fact this is
not always the case. This questions how
responsible an individual can be held for
any action when suffering some form of
mental illness. In such a case, although a
guilty act (actus reus) may present itself, with
no guilty mind the accused cannot legally
be said to be in a fit state to stand before the
courts. However, this would seem to be
debatable in the case of Stefan Kiszko. In
October 1975, Kiszko was questioned
about the murder of an 11-year-old school-
girl from West Yorkshire. Kiszko was told
that if he agreed to sign the confession he
could return home to his mother that even-
ing. Yet at the age of 26 years, Kiszko was
known to have a mental ‘retardation’, hav-
ing the understanding of a 12-year-old
child (Campbell, 2006). Therefore, it is
debatable whether Kiszko (even though he
was in the vicinity of the crime) had both a
guilty mind and took part in a guilty act.
Even at the time of his arrest and question-
ing it was doubtful if Kiszko was capable of
having the requisite mens rea for this par-
ticular actus reus.
A plea based upon the notion of dimin-
ished responsibility, or insanity, then gives
the court an option that may not have
presented itself at any other time. This alone
allows the court to recommend hospital-
isation or community supervision as a
viable alternative to a prison sentence. Yet,
for the most part what is being called for is
a moral judgement. Is it morally right to
place a person into a regime in which they
are unable to function? Sim (1990) has
suggested that mentally disordered offenders
are incapable of conforming with the strict
regimes enforced within the prison system,
to which Heller et al. (1996) add that prison
is an inhumane setting in which to hold the
mentally disturbed. It could be argued that
when placed into an inappropriate setting
the mentally disordered offender, or indeed
one who has not experienced such a regime
in the past, is more likely to feel alienated
and depressed which all too often leads to a
deterioration in the mental condition
(Mason & Mercer, 1999). Indeed the Penal
Affairs Consortium, reporting on the
period 1991–1997, estimated that in 1991
‘. . . 3% of the sentenced prison population
(approximately 1,100 prisoners) were suf-
fering from psychiatric disorders warranting
transfer to an NHS hospital’ and concluded
that with regard to remand prisoners ‘. . .
9% of the sample needed transfer to an
NHS hospital’ (Penal Affairs Consortium,
1998, pp. 1–2).
The plea of insanity then allows the
criminal justice system the opportunity to
recognise that there are other issues that
may need to be resolved before any punitive
sentence can be sought. Indeed, Hollin
(1992) questions whether a punitive pun-
ishment should ever be sought in the case of
mentally disordered offenders. It is an eth-
ical dilemma that exists for all psychologists
and psychiatrists in countries that still have
use of the death penalty. ‘In countries where
the death penalty is used’, says Hollin, ‘. . .
should clinical treatment be made available
to a psychotic prisoner so that when he or
she is returned to normal functioning they
can be executed?’ (Hollin, 1992, p. 114).
Where individual mental health remains at
question the appropriateness of retributive
punishment remains for the victim, the
accused and society in its widest sense.
Where there is a case for the abolition
of the death penalty — whether because of
the plea of insanity or for other reasons —
others have argued for its ‘protected use’.
Indeed, Dudley Sharp (1997) has ques-
tioned the position of the abolitionists, stat-
ing that it is ‘morally untenable’ to suggest
that ‘. . . if two acts have the same ending or
result, then these two acts are morally
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equivalent’. For instance, Sharp argues that
although legal incarceration and kidnap
result in the same outcome (ie imprison-
ment against one’s will), one takes place as a
result of the legal process, where the other
takes place as a result of an illegal act.
The argument would seem to gain
momentum when notions of deterrence
and incapacitation are added. John
McAdams, of the Marquette University,
Department of Political Science, states that,
‘If we execute murderers and there is in fact
no deterrent effect, we have killed a bunch
of murderers. If we fail to execute murder-
ers, and doing so would in fact have
deterred other murderers, we have allowed
the killing of a bunch of innocent victims. I
would much rather risk the former. This, to
me, is not a tough call’ (McAdams, 2001).
Sharp (1997) concurs, indeed gives the
argument growing emphasis stating that
6 per cent of young adults convicted of
murder were arrested and convicted of a
second murder, within six years of the date
of parole. This, says Sharp, equates to an
estimated 810 convicted persons having
killed a further 821 victims. If, however,
these previously convicted murderers had
received the death penalty, then all 821
victims lives would have been saved.
Although it is impossible to know which
6 per cent of murderers would take a
second life, if all murderers were to be
executed, as Sharp is suggesting, then there
would be no question of further harm or
death of an innocent, only a politically
(in)defensible position.
Similar discussions can be held following
the statements made by David Davis who,
as the Shadow Home Secretary, said, ‘I
would bring back capital punishment for
serial murderers . . .’ concluding that, ‘The
reason why people are against the death
penalty very often is because of the risk of
getting it wrong. With serial murders, that is
unlikely to happen’ (Watt, 2003). Does this
then provide for the defensible position?
Interestingly, Cole (1995) notes that in all
the 38 states of North America with the
death penalty, there are certain standards
to be observed before the death penalty can
be imposed. First, the accused cannot be
insane and second, criminal intent — as in
Britain — must be proved. Indeed, Cole
goes on to say that in cases of mental
retardation the death penalty is rarely
imposed. Various reasons are cited by Cole,
yet what seems to stand out is the recogni-
tion that through retardation it is unlikely
that fair representation can be achieved in
such cases. It would seem that debate on the
moral problems surrounding the use of the
death penalty and the position of the men-
tally disordered offender has reached much
the same conclusion in the United States as
it has in Britain. There must be both a
guilty mind and a guilty act and, with the
absence of either, the accused must be
diverted from the criminal justice system to
the more humane setting of hospitalisation
and treatment. The United States, and
Britain, would seem to argue for the role of
treatment when there is clear evidence
of mental illness.
In Britain, as in those states in North
America plus the District of Columbia, that
do not have the use of the death penalty,
there arises the question of what is to be
done with offenders who do not receive the
death penalty. Sharp (1997) states that there
is a continued escalation in the costs of
imposing life sentences for those who
would have otherwise received the death
penalty. He reports the figure for the
United States as standing in the region of
$1.2 million to $3.6 million over an estim-
ated 50-year period for those sentenced to
‘life without the possibility of parole’
(Sharp, 1997). This does not include those
undergoing appeal on the grounds of insan-
ity or diminished responsibility. Figures for
Britain reach a similar position. According
to RCP (2004), life imprisonment for a
single offender costs in the region of
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£37,500 per annum. If taken over the same
period of 50 years, this would take the
estimated costs to £1.875 million for that
same prisoner.
Moreover, the question seems to be,
what is to be done in such cases when
prison is inappropriate? The Mental Health
Act 1983 clearly states that those suffering
from mental illness should be diverted from
the criminal justice system at the earliest
opportunity. However, in many instances,
the prison may be where those convicted
end up, at least for part of their time, if
there are no places available in hospitals or
secure units. Indeed the Penal Affairs Con-
sortium (1998) took issue with the fact that,
contrary to Home Office circular 66/90
which states that mentally disordered
offenders should never be remanded to
prison, in 1995, 2,481 people were re-
manded for psychiatric reports. This would
seem to suggest that the recognition exists
that prison is inappropriate to support the
needs of those with mental health issues.
Indeed, just four years later the Department
for Health (1999) reported that there were
up to 10,000 individuals suffering mental
health issues that needed to be addressed
under the provision for health care in pri-
sons (Home Office, 1999, para. 11), yet
there is no discussion of improvements in
facilities which must be made available.
Morally, there can be no question as to
the appropriateness or otherwise of incar-
ceration for individuals who are suffering
some form of mental illness. However, this
still leaves the notion that there is such a
thing as a mentally ordered offender. What
then is the value of such a defence for the
accused? For Kemshall, Canton, and Bailey
(2004), the value is found in the fact that,
for many individuals, it is the first time that
there has been recognition of their difficul-
ties and that once recognised help can be
offered. Again, the defence of insanity can
raise the awareness of the judicial system,
and the recognition that but for a psycho-
logical impairment the individual would
have acted in an altogether different way.
Conversely, it is the work of Erving
Goffman (1968, 1990) that offers an expla-
nation of why an individual may not enter a
plea of insanity. Goffman (1990) suggests
that in the recognition of insanity or any
other social stigma, society places a label
upon such individuals as a way of explaining
their behaviour. Yet this label, says Goffman,
is almost impossible to remove. The label of
insanity creates a stigma around the indi-
vidual, which may preclude or exclude
them from certain social settings, or even
social inclusion. For instance, the applica-
tion of such a label may place barriers in the
path of the individual in the work place,
with questions arising as to the ability, reli-
ability, trust, and even the level of under-
standing and education (Social Exclusion
Unit, 2002), even though these assumptions
may not be warranted, or appropriate.
Just as importantly for individuals may be
the belief that once made subject to a
hospital order, they can be held at the
discretion of the medical staff, and held
without important information. Lord Jus-
tice Woolf (1991) suggested that any
offender given a custodial sentence lasting
more than one year should be given access
to a structured sentence plan and a release
date. However, this does not seem to be the
case for persons held within the medical
system. Conversely, there is the advantage-
ous position of having the case dismissed, or
the sentence given over to a community
punishment, if the defendant is found to be
suffering from a form of mental illness. Yet,
even with the opportunity to supervise
individuals in the community and therefore
to support them in the environment to
which they are most accustomed, and even
though Kemshall et al. (2004) note that the
Royal College of Psychiatrists estimate that
‘. . . at least 3,000 offender-patients would
benefit from community supervision . . .’,
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‘. . . despite cautious advocacy from Her
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation . . . for
its increased use, it remains infrequent’.
As to the value of the plea of insanity, it
would seem that the evidence is double-
edged. The area of insanity is not well
defined, so far as the law is concerned,
which leads to problems of consistency in
judgement and application. Society is still
influenced by the labels that may be applied
and the accused may be placed inappro-
priately, as has been noted by the Penal
Affairs Consortium (1998). For Goffman
(1990) this is due to the labelling process:
he points out that, once released, offenders
may still be viewed with an air of caution or
disdain.
David Davis, the former Shadow Home
Secretary, would argue that there is a strong
case for the protected use of the death
penalty and, as has already been noted, the
victim is of paramount importance. How-
ever, it is when the system gets it wrong
that not only will victims and their families
suffer, but also the family of the innocent
condemned. The grief experienced, and the
injustice felt, by the families of Timothy
Evans, Derek Bentley, Stefan Kiszko and
many others stand testimony to this fact.
This point is underlined by the RCP report
(2004), where it states that: ‘Research on
the prison population by the Office for
National Statistics in 1997 found that 14 per
cent of women, 10 per cent of men on
remand and 7 per cent of sentenced men
had a functional psychosis such as schizo-
phrenia or manic depression in the year
leading up to their imprisonment’. Perhaps,
as Cohen (2002) has suggested, it is not
necessarily the individual that is at fault, but
the media and social representations which
drive the social panic and the need for
closure. It is this need for justice which
produces the convictions of a questionable
nature. As Lord Fellowes (see RCP, 2004)
said: ‘asking the prison system to care for
these offenders is “a gross imposition”,
because it is a job for which it is unqualified
and ill equipped, and for which it is not
funded’.
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